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For single-photon quantum key generation, it is shown that the use of a shared secret key extended
via a pseudo-random number generator may simultaneously enhance the security and efficiency of
the cryptosystem. This effect arises from the intrinsic performance difference between quantum
detectors with versus without knowledge of the key, a purely quantum effect and a new principle
for key generation. No intrusion level estimation is needed and the method is directly applicable to
realistic systems with imperfections. Quantum direct encryption is also made possible by such use
of a secret key.
PACS: 03.67 Dd
Considerable progress has been made in the field of
quantum cryptography [1], mainly in quantum key gen-
eration (QKG) where fresh keys can in principle be
generated between two users, Adam and Babe, with
information-theoretic security against an active attacker
Eve for single-photon systems in the asymptotic limit.
This involves an advantage creation process during which
the users establish, via quantum effects, a better commu-
nication channel between themselves for their selected
data and measurement results compared to what Eve
may get. They then employ error correction and privacy
amplification to obtain a final generated key that Eve
has little information about, which can be utilized for
other purpose such as the secret key in a direct encryp-
tion system. However, the problems of quantifying the
actual security level and efficiency of a realistic finite bit-
sequence QKG system remain unsolved. One source of
the difficulty is the statistical fluctuation in a concrete fi-
nite bit-sequence cryptosystem. Thus, during the process
of intrusion-level estimation (ILE) in which the users cre-
ate their advantage over Eve, false alarms may occur that
adversely affect the final security and efficiency tradeoff
of the overall cryptographic protocol [4]. Also, the side
information leaked to Eve during error correction and
privacy amplification is hard to estimate accurately [2],
and accounting for them via simple bounds [3] often lead
to precipitous drops in efficiency. There are also well-
known problems from system imperfections, and other
problems to be explained elsewhere.
In this paper, the direct use of a shared secret seed
key expanded via a pseudo-random number generator
(PRNG) to a running key that determines the choice
of basis in standard 4-state BB84 is proposed and an-
alyzed against individual and collective attacks. In gen-
eral, such use of a shared secret key allows the users
to create advantage via the optimal quantum receiver
principle:- Even if a full copy of the quantum state is
available to Eve, the optimal quantum detector that the
users may employ with knowledge of the secret key per-
forms better than the optimal detector Eve may employ
by a quantum measurement without knowledge of the key
even if she may subsequently use the key on her measure-
ment result. This performance difference does not exist if
the system is described classically. This principle, called
KCQ (keyed communication in quantum noise) key gen-
eration, constitutes a new and more powerful advantage
creation mechanism via quantum effect. It was described
in ref [4], briefly in ref [5], and mentioned in ref. [6] where
the use of a PRNG on mesoscopic coherent states for
direct encryption was experimentally demonstrated that
does not involve the above KCQ key generation principle.
With the many possibilities of different implementations,
the power of this principle is illustrated in this paper for
single-photon BB84 and corresponding Ekert protocols.
It will be shown how the security/efficiency of a con-
crete BB84 cryptosystem may be improved and quanti-
fied. Among the advantages are the alleviation of the
problems mentioned in the last paragraph. It also makes
quantum direct encryption (QDE) possible, in contrast
to standard BB84. Some of the presented results have
been given in ref [4] along with a more detailed general
treatment, but the present paper is self-contained.
Consider the standard 4-state single-photon BB84
cryptosystem, in which each data bit is represented by
one of two possible bases of a qubit, say the vertical and
horizontal states |1〉, |3〉 and the diagonal states |2〉, |4〉.
In standard BB84, the choice of basis is revealed after
Babe makes her measurements, and the mismatched ones
are discarded. It has been suggested [7] that some ad-
vantages obtain when a secret key is used for basis de-
termination with usual ILE and the resulting protocol is
also secure against joint attacks [8]. Clearly, no key can
be generated after subtracting the basis determination
secret key if a fresh key is used for each qubit. It was
proposed in refs. [7, 8] that a long m-bit secret key is
to be used in a longer n-qubit sequence with repetition.
However, even if such use does not affect the average in-
formation that Eve may obtain, it gives rise to such an
unfavorable distribution that security is seriously com-
promised. This is because with a probability 1/2, Eve can
2guess correctly the basis of a whole block of n/m qubits
by selecting the qubits where the same secret bit is used
repetitively. For a numerical illustration, let n = 103 and
m = 102. Then with a probability 2−15 ∼ 0.3 × 10−4,
Eve can successfully launch an opaque (intercept/resend)
attack that gives full information at the dangerous 15%
level [1] on the total bit sequence while yielding no error
to the users. Much stronger attacks can be built upon
such partial opaque attacks. In general, the strong cor-
relation from such repetitive use would seriously affect
the appropriate quantitative security level [9], and use of
a large m relative to n would severely degrade the effi-
ciency.
This problem is alleviated when a seed key Ks is first
passed through a PRNG to yield a running key Kr that
is used for basis determination, as indicated in Fig. 1.
In practice, any standard cipher running in the stream-
cipher mode [10] can be used as a PRNG. Even a LFSR
(linear feedback shift register) is good in the present sit-
uation. A LFSR with openly known (minimal) connec-
tion polynomial and initial state Ks generates a “pseudo-
random” output with period 2|Ks| [10]. When a LFSR is
used as a (classical) stream cipher, it is insecure against
known-plaintext attack [10], in which Eve would obtain
the seed key from the running key which is itself obtained
from the input data and the output bits. However, there
is no such attack in key generation where Adam picks
his data bits randomly. In an attack where Eve guesses
the key before measurement, the system is undermined
completely with a probability of 2−|Ks|. Since it is prac-
tically easy to have |Ks| ∼ 10
3 or larger in a stream
cipher, such a guessing attack would have a much lower,
and indeed insignificant, probability of success compared
to, say, the guessing attack Eve may launch by guessing
the message authentication key used to create the public
channel needed in BB84. In contrast to the case without
a PRNG, no subset of the data is vulnerable to a guess-
ing attack that would correctly guess a subset of the key
with a high probability.
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FIG. 1: The qb-KCQ scheme. Left – Two bases, I and II.
Right – Overall encryption involves modulation with bases
determined by a running key Kr generated from a seed key
Ks via an encryption mechanism denoted by the box ENC.
Next, we show that the seed key has complete
information-theoretic security against ciphertext-only at-
tacks. Let ρkx be the quantum state corresponding to data
sequence x = x1 · · ·xn and running key k1 · · · kn. For at-
tacking the seed key Ks or running key Kr, the quantum
ciphertext reduces to ρk =
∑
x pxρ
k
x where px is the apri-
ori probability of x. In our KCQ approach, we grant a
full copy of the quantum state to Eve for the purpose of
bounding her information [11]. By an optimal measure-
ment on the qubits, Eve’s probability of correctly identi-
fying k (i.e., Kr) and then Ks may be obtained via ρ
k.
Since each qubit is modulated by its own corresponding
data bit, we have ρkx = ρ
k1
x1
⊗ · · · ⊗ ρknxn . For uniform data
commonly assumed for key generation, the Xi are inde-
pendent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) Bernoulli random
variables with equal probabilities. Thus each ρki = Ii/2
after averaging over xi for any value of ki, with resulting
ρk =
⊗n
i=1 Ii/2 completely independent of k. So Eve
can obtain no information on Kr or Ks at all even if she
possesses a full copy of the quantum signal.
Next, we quantify the minimum security level against
collective attacks on the random data, for which Eve is
assumed to have a full copy of the quantum signal. By
“collective attack” we mean the situation where Eve per-
forms a constant qubit-by-qubit measurement on her (fic-
titious) full copy in the absence of any knowledge on Ks
or Kr, but may employ collective classical processing of
the measurement results to take into account correlations
induced by Ks. This is analogous but different from the
usual “collective attacks” in BB84, because there is no
question of probe setting in the present case. Since the
term “individual attack” in BB84 does not include collec-
tive classical processing, our use of the term “collective
attack” is appropriate and allows the further generaliza-
tion to joint measurements in the most general case of
“joint attacks” [12]. Whatever the terminology,Ks orKr
is actually never revealed to Eve so that all her knowledge
of the secret key must come from her quantum measure-
ments. Practically, so long as Eve does not have long-
term quantum memory, she would need to measure the
qubits even if she could obtainKr at a future time, which
is actually impossible if the key is never used again.
Nevertheless, solely for the purpose of lower bounding
Eve’s information (which is difficult to estimate otherwise
because of the correlations introduced by Ks among the
qubits), here we conceptually grant Eve the actual Ks,
and hence Kr, after she made her measurements. Our
KCQ principle of key generation via optimal quantum
receiver performance with versus without knowledge of
Ks is easily seen to work here: Even with a full copy of
the quantum state Eve is bound to make errors in con-
trast to the users. Indeed, her optimal measurement can
be found by parametrizing an arbitrary orthogonal basis
which she measures, and optimizing the parameters as-
suming thatKs is then granted to her. It is readily shown
that general POVM measurements reduce to othogonal
3ones in this optimum binary quantum decision problem
on a qubit. Not surprisingly, her optimal error rate is
∼ 0.15 and is obtained via the “Breidbart” basis [13]
well-known in BB84, for which one basis vector bisects
the angle between |1〉 and |2〉 or |2〉 and |3〉 depending
on the bit assignment, and also in this case by the basis
obtained by rotating the Breidbart basis by pi/4.
It may be observed that security against joint attacks
seems to be also obtained, for the same reason that Eve
would make many more errors except with an exponen-
tially small (in |Ks|) probability, while the users make
none in the noiseless limit. However, there are problems
of counting the secret key bits used and the appropriate-
ness of the entropy condition [9]. A detailed treatment
of joint-attack security will be given elsewhere.
A key verification phase is to be added in a complete
protocol after error correction and privacy amplification,
which should always be employed in key generation for
practical reasons. For this purpose, one may produce a
short hashed version K ′g of the final generated key Kg,
and encrypt K ′g with, say, one-time pad from either A to
B or B to A. The hash function used may also be keyed, as
usually assumed in BB84 for the message authentication
that creates the “unjammable” public channel guarantee-
ing unconditional security [10,Ch 9] even if no other au-
thentication is used. The total number of secret key bits
expended during protocol execution, including Ks, is to
be subtracted from the generated key. For key generation
protocols with nonzero key generation rate, including our
qubit KCQ scheme above under collective attacks, such
cost may be made arbitrarily small in rate for large n.
Notice that in the present case it does not matter what
Eve did in her interference during the protocol execution.
As long as Kg is verified, it is correct except with an ex-
ponentially small (in the length of the verification key
length |Kv|) probability, and Eve only knows Kg with
a similar probability. Since her information is bounded
with a full copy of the quantum state already granted to
here, there is no need for intrusion-level estimation to as-
certain her information as a function of her disturbance.
The above scheme may be generalized in many obvi-
ous ways. One is to allow M possible bases on the qubit
Bloch sphere. This would increase security without com-
promising efficiency as in the BB84 case, because there
is no mismatched qubits to throw away and there is no
need to communicate openly what bases were measured.
It is readily shown that in the limit M → ∞, Eve’s er-
ror rate goes to the maximum value 1/2 for collective
attacks also, not just individual attacks [4]. Also, the
scheme evidently works in the same way for Ekert type
protocols that involve shared entangled pairs. Further-
more, the same principle may be employed for coherent-
state systems with considerable number of photons [4, 5],
although the corresponding security analysis is more in-
volved and would be treated in detail elsewhere.
In the present approach, error correction may be car-
ried out by a forward error correcting code and the result-
ing performance analysis is not burdened by the need to
consider Eve’s probe and whether she may hold it with
quantum memory. If the channel is estimated to have
an error rate pc below 15%, advantage is created against
collective attacks as shown above, and the existence of
a protocol that yields a net key generation rate may be
proved asymptotically as usual [14]. This channel error
rate estimation is not for advantage creation, and is not
necessary in two-way interactive error-correcting proce-
dures, because the KCQ principle already guarantees the
users’ advantage over Eve. It is for correcting the users’
channel noise and can be carried out at any time in con-
trast to ILE. Such a channel characterization is always
needed in any communication line.
In particular, as long as pc is below the threshold ∼
0.15, the users could employ an error correcting code with
rate R such that
1− h2(pc) > R > 1− h2(0.15), (1)
where h2(·) is the binary entropy function and 1 − h2(·)
is the capacity of the corresponding (BSC) channel. The
second inequality in (1) ensures that Eve could not get
at the data because the code rate R exceeds her capac-
ity. Under the first inequality in (1) or a tighter one for
concrete codes, the users can correct the channel errors.
For concrete protocols there is the general problem of
assuring that the side information Eve has on the error
correction and privacy amplification procedures would
not allow her to obtain too much information on Kg.
Under the (unrealistic) assumption that only individual
classical processing of each qubit measurement result is
made, which is the i.i.d. assumption underlying many
BB84 security analyses, Eve’s Renyi entropy, Shannon
entropy, and error rate are simply related. Quantitative
results can then be easily stated as usual. For collective
and general attacks there is the problem of estimating
the Renyi entropy for applying the privacy amplification
theorem [2]. With ILE in concrete BB84 protocols, this
Renyi entropy estimate has never been carried out, with
the difficulty compounded by finite-n statistical fluctua-
tions. The problem is much alleviated for KCQ proto-
cols for which a single quantum copy is already granted
to Eve for quantitatively bounding her information. In
particular, all the side information from error correction
is accounted for by the second inequality of (1). The cor-
rect way to deal with the privacy amplification problem
and a general treatment using a proper security criterion
would be detailed elsewhere.
The complete key generation protocol, to be called qb-
KCQ, is given schematically as follows:
(i) Adam sends a sequence of n random bits by a se-
quence of n qubit product states, each chosen ran-
domly among two orthogonal bases via a running
4key Kr generated by using a PRNG on a seed key
Ks shared by Babe.
(ii) An error control and privacy amplification proce-
dure is employed by the users to correct their chan-
nel errors and obtain a final generated keyKg, while
assuring , e.g. under (1), that even after all the asso-
ciated side information and a full copy of the quan-
tum state is granted to Eve, errors remain for her
so she has little information on Kg.
(iii) The users employ key verification as in message au-
thentication to verify that they share the same Kg.
The above protocol can be easily modified for perform-
ing direct data encryption. Instead of randomly chosen
bits, Adam sends the data out as in (i) with error control
coding but no privacy amplification. The key verification
(iii) becomes just the usual message authentication. The
efficiency and security of such qb-QDE systems and their
extensions for protecting against various attacks will be
detailed in the future. Note that QDE is not possible
with BB84 or its secret-key modification in refs [7, 8], the
former because of key sifting, the latter because of the
serious security breach of Eve getting correctly a whole
block of n/m data bits with probability 1/2 described
above.
In sum, the advantages of qb-KCQ over the corre-
sponding single-photon BB84 key generation are:
(1) Efficiency is increased in that there are no wasted
qubits and no need for public communication except
for key verification, while security is increased, espe-
cially for large number of possible bases.
(2) No intrusion level estimation is required, thus no
false-alarm problem or any statistical fluctuation
problem associated with such estimation.
(3) The security/efficiency analysis is unaffected even for
a multi-photon source whose output state is diagonal
in the photon-number representation [15], as a full
copy of the single-photon state is already granted to
Eve for bounding her information.
(4) The security/efficiency quantification is similarly ex-
tended to realistic lossy situations, while new analysis
not yet performed is otherwise needed to take into
account, e.g., attacks based on approximate proba-
bilistic cloning [16].
(5) The security/efficiency analysis is also similarly ex-
tended to include any side information for a finite-n
protocol, with no question of holding onto the probes.
(6) There are practical advantages in reducing the num-
ber of random data bits needed by Adam and photon
counters needed by Babe in an experimental imple-
mentation.
(7) Direct encryption without going through key gener-
ation first may be employed, which is impossible for
BB84.
In conclusion, a new approach involving shared secret
key and the KCQ principle for obtaining secure and ef-
ficient qubit key generation has been described that dis-
penses with intrusion level estimation and allows quan-
tum direct encryption. Since a shared secret key is al-
ready needed for message authentication during protocol
execution in current quantum key generation protocols,
one should also employ a seed key expanded to a running
key as in our qb-KCQ scheme to enhance simultaneously
the security and efficiency of the cryptosystems.
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